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Proposal for a 
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
on investor compensation schemes 
(presented by the Commission) EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
A.  General considerations 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
1.  Origin of the proposal 
On 10 May 1993 the Council adopted Directive 93/22/EEC on investment services in 
the securities field(!>,  the ."Investment Services Directive
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•  This Directive is a parallel 
text  to  the  Second  Banking  Coordination Directive<
2>,  which  entered  into  force  on 
1 January  1993  and  provides  the  si~gle  licence  pr "European  passport"  for  credit 
institutions.  The list of banking activities subject to mutual recognition annexed to the 
Second Banking Directive includes the full range of  securities ~usiness. The Investment 
Services Directive,  when  it  enters  into  force  on  1  January  1996,  will  provide the 
equivalent "European passport" for non-bank investment firms, thereby allowing such 
firms also to operate on a cross-border basis, either by the free provision of services or 
through branches, on the strength of the authorization  issued  by  and the prudential 
supervision carried on by the home State competent ,authorities. 
Article. 9  of the  Commission•s  original  ·investment  services  proposal(3>,  which  was 
presented in January  1989, included investor compensation arrangements among the 
prudential rules. to be draWn  up and enforced by the Member States. 
The basic requirement was that each investment firm was to  be "a member of a general 
compensation scheme designed to  protect investors who  are  prevented from  having 
claims satisfied because of the bankruptcy or default of the inves~ent firm". 
While the general rule made the home Member State authorities responsible for drawing 
up and applying the prudential rules a distinction was made as regards compensation 
arrangements, pending further harmonization, betWeen investment business carried out 
in another Member State on a services basis - where the home State regime was to 
apply - and business carried on through a branch in the host country - where that host 
State's arrangements were to apply. 
The reason given in the EXplanatory  Memor~dum  for.this di.stinction was that "some 
coordination of compensation funds, including the minimum amount available in each 
Member State to reimburse investors, will be necessary before the home-country regime 
can be applied to branches as well as to services business". 
OJ No L  141, 11.6.1993, p.  27. 
Directive 89/646/EEC, OJ No L 386, 30.12.1989, p.  1. 
COM(88) 778 of 16.12.1988, OJ No C 43, 22.2.1989,,p. 7. 
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The interim approach proposed by the Commission did not find support in the Council 
and there was wide support among the Member States for a rapid move to full home 
country control and therefore for early harmonization of  investor compensation schemes. 
It was felt that since it was the home Member State authorities which issued the single 
licence to the investment firm and were responsible for the prudential supervision of all 
its activities, including those of  its branches, it should be for the investor compensation 
scheme of the home State to bear the consequences of the failure of the firms in  its 
charge.  , 
However,  there  was  a general  agreement thai the  subject of investor compensation 
schemes raised a number of  complex issues and that any attempt to resolve them in the 
context of  the discussions on the Investment Services Directive might delay even further 
the adoption of that Directive which had originally been intended to ·enter into force at 
the same time as the Second Banking Directive, namely on 1 January  1993. 
It was finally agreed not to cover the matter of  investor compensation in the Investment 
Services Directive.  As a result in the text adopted by the Council on  10 May  1993 
Article 12 limits itself to a requirement that investors should be informed before doing 
business with an investment firm of any  investor compensation arrangements which 
would  be  applicable  to  them.  At  the  same  time  the  Council  took  note  of the 
Commission's  statement  that  it  would  submit  proposals  on  the  harmonization  of 
compensation systems covering transactions by investment fimis by 31 July 1993 at the 
latest.  The Council stated that it "will act on those proposal within the shortest possible 
time with the aim of  bringing the systems proposed into effect on the same date as [the 
Investment Services] Directive". 
This proposal for a Council Directive on investor compensation schemes constitutes the 
proposal which the Commission announced when the Investment Services Directive was 
adopted and represents the further harmonization already envisaged in the Commission•s 
original proposal on investmen~ services. 
2.  Need for and purpose of investor compensation schemes 
Given  proper supervision,  the  failure  of an  investment  firm  should  be a  relatively 
exceptional event.  Failure should be all the more unusual after the prudential rules and 
the conduct of  business rules laid down in Articles 10 and 11 of  the Investment Services 
Directive and the requirements laid down in  the Capital Adequacy Directive<
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)  are in 
force throughout the Community. 
Article 10 of  the Investment Services Directive, for example, will oblige Member States 
to require their firms to enforce sound administrative and accounting procedures and ·to 
make adequate arrangements to protect investors• rights over their money and securities. 
The Capital  Adequacy Directive will  oblige all  investment firms  holding the single 
licence to hold a certain level of minimum capital. 
Directive 93/6/EEC, OJ No L 141, 11.6.1993, p.  I. 
3 It might  then  perhaps  be  argued  that  Community  action  m  the  field  of investor 
protection is unnecessary. 
The Commission believes that there is a need. 
To begin with, no system of supervision can ever be watertight and, however good the 
prudential  rules  may be,  failures  will  sometimes occur.  In particular,  no rules  can 
prevent fraud, although good supervi~ion will expose it sooner rather than later. 
Two cases of failure should be distinguished: 
(a)  Failure of the investment firm without frausf 
In this first case, investors' securities held by the investment firm for safekeeping 
and administration or pending delivery to clients  or pending disposal should not 
be at risk.  Ownership of  such securities remains with the investor, who should be 
able to recover them without undue difficulty. 
On the  other hand,  clients'  funds  held  by  the  investment firm,  following  the 
disposal of securities or pending the purchase of  securities, may be impossible to 
recover if they become part of  the mass of assets of a bankrupt firm.  In that case 
the  investor  would  simply  have  a  claim  in  the  bankruptcy  proceedings.  A 
compensation  scheme should allow the investor to  obtain  some compensation 
without having to wait for the completion of  those (normally lengthy) proceedings. 
(b)  Failure of the inve$tJent firm as a result of fraud 
Any firm may have the misfortune to suffer occasional dishoneSty on the part of 
an employee. The firm would normally make good any loss to clients immediately 
and might well have insurance covering such an  eventuality.  Any problems in 
such cases should be dealt  with  between the  investor and  the firm,  with  the 
involvement if necessary of the supervisory authority.  There should be no need 
in such a case for the intervention of an investor compensation scheme. 
On the other hand, the discovery by the competent authorities of serious fraud 
throughout a firm involving misappropriation of  clients' assets would probably lead 
to its closure and winding-up. 
If clients' money and/or secUrities had been misappropriated and if, as is likely i.n 
such cases, the firm's assets were insufficient to meet investors' claims there would 
be a role for the investor compensation scheme. 
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It could  of course  be  argued  that  risk  is  an  inherent part of any  investment 
operation and that the investor should take due care in his choice of and relations 
with  an  investment firm.  No  one,  after all  is  obliged to  purchase investment 
services. 
On the other hand, it  is clearly difficult for the smaller investor in  particular to 
gauge accurately the financial and management strength of an investment firm. 
Furthermore, the knowledge that an investor compensation scheme is available can 
help maintain confidence in the markets and encourage smaller investor interest 
and involvement in them. 
3.  Main objectives of the proposal 
The proposal pursues a number of related objectives. 
First and foremost, it constitutes a necessary supplement to the single licence system 
based on home country control established by the Investment Services Directive. 
Article Sa of  the Treaty states that the Community shall adopt measures to establish the 
internal market.  The Investment Services Directive is the central measure to that end 
for  investment  firms.  The present  proposal  on  investor  compensation  schemes  is 
intended to facilitate the proper functioning of the single market. 
The  requirement  to  have  an  investor  compensation  scheme  formed  part  of the 
Commissionts original proposal for an Investment Services Directive.  The Commission 
was conscious of the need to ensure investor protection and thus encourage the small 
investor in particular to invest in securities. 
At the present time most of the Member States do have some investor compensation 
arrangements (these are summarized in the Annex) but these are often limited, covering 
for example the liabilities of stock exchange members only.  The vast majority of the 
Member States do not_ have a scheme or schemes corresponding in scope to the wide 
range of  services covered by the Investment Services Directive.  Certain Member States 
have no investor compensation scheme at all. 
In order to avoid causing confusion in the minds of investors and to give them equal 
confidence when dealing with non-domestic investment firms operating via branches or 
through the cross'!'frontier provision of services as  when they  deal with domestically 
incorporated inveStment firms it seems reasOnable and indeed necessary to provide for 
some  minimum  investor  compensation  arrangements  throughout  the  Community 
covering the case where an investment firm fails and is unable to return to investors the 
money or securities belonging to them. 
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There  is  a  further  danger  that  in  the  absence  of some  harmonization  of investor 
compensation  schemes  Member  States  ~ay feel  justified,  for  reasons  of investor 
protection, in requiring investment firms from other Member States providing services 
or operating through branches to belong to the host State compensation scheme where 
there is no home State scheme or the home State scheme is not considered to provide 
equivalent coverage. 
Any  such requirements and the need to  demonstrate equivalence might well  lead to 
serious practical difficulties for the operation of the single market and the exercise by 
investment firms of the right of establishment and freedom to provide services. 
A Community Directive is the only available means for achieving the harmonization that 
is needed. 
However, the proposed Directive only contains the minimum harmonization necessary 
to achieve the objectives being pursued.  It would require Member States to have an 
investor compensation scheme or schemes.  It would set a minimum Community level 
of  compensation per investor, while allowing Member States to provide greater coverage 
if they so wish.  Matters such as the basis on which schemes are organized and the 
precise financing arrangements would be left to the discretion of the Member States. 
The Commission has followed a  similar approach in its proposal  for a Directive on 
~eposit-guarantee schemes<S). 
4.  Sumnuuy of  the iustification of  the proposal in the light of  the principle of  subsidiaritY 
(a)  What are the objectives of the proposed action with  respect to the obligations 
placed upon the Community? 
Article Sa of the Treaty places the obligation on the Community to establish the 
internal market in accordance, inter alia. with Article 57(2) on which the current 
proposal, like the Investment Services Directive from which it derives, is based. 
The main aim is· to "facilitate the operation of the internal market for investment 
firms whereby such firms will be able to operate throughout the Community on 
the basis of a single licence issued by and subject to prudential control by the 
home  country  authorities.  The  need  for  some  harmonization  of  investor · 
compensation  rules  was  envisaged  m  the  Commission's  initial  proposal  on 
investment services. 
COM{92) 188 final, OJ No C 163, 30.6.1992 and COM(93)  ... 
6 (b)  Is the  action  envisaged  a  matter of exclusive  Community  competence or one 
shared with the Member States? 
The establishment and operation of investor compensation schemes are  a matter 
of exclusive Community competence since only the Community can introduce an 
obligation for each Member State to have a scheme corresponding to the scope of 
the Investment  Services Directive and  providing a  uniform  minimum  level of 
protection for investors. 
(c)  What means of action are available to the Community? 
Only a Community directive laying down agreed minimum standards can achieve 
the desired objective. 
(d)  Are uniform rules necessary? 
Apart from the basic minimum standards (e.g. minim.um level and extent of  cover, 
investor  information),  Member  States  are  free  to  organize  their  investor 
compensation schemes as they wish.  The scope thus left for national discretion 
is large. 
5.  Link with the deposit-guarantee proposal 
As was stated earlier, a credit institution providing investment services qualifies as an 
investment firm under the Investment Services Directive. 
Since the aim of the investor compensation proposal is to cover investors  entrusting 
their  money  or securities  to  any  investment  firm,  it  is  necessary  to  make  proper 
provision for credit institutions providing such services. 
At the same time the proposal for a Directive on deposit-guarantee schemes which is 
currently  before  the  Council  is  intended  to  protect  customers'  cash  deposits.  The 
Commission originally proposed a harmonized minimum of  ECU 1  S 000 but raised this  . 
amount in its amended proposal to ECU 20 000 at the request of Parliament. 
However,  in  addition  to taking  deposits,  banks  may  also  buy  and  sell  securities on 
behalf of their customers and may hold clients' securities on a temporary or long-term 
basis.  Such securities would not appear on the bank's balance sheet. 
In the  event of a  credit institution  becoming  insolvent,  clients'  securities held by  it 
should not be at risk provided that the clients' title to such securities is clear.  On the 
other hand, clients' securities could be at risk if there was a fraudulent misuse by the 
bank.  This risk  would clearly be outside the scope of the deposit-guarantee proposal 
and should be covered by the investor protection arrangements. 
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As a result, credit institutions engaged in deposit-taki·ng and securities business will be 
obliged to pay for and offer to their clients two types· of cover, which could of course 
be organized under a single scheme.  However, as regards claims in respect of  investors~  .. 
money held by such credit institutions Member States should be given the freedom to 
determine themselves under which of the two Directives such claims should fall. 
This is only possible if a similar level of cover is envisaged for the two schemes. 
6.  Choice of the minimum level of coverage 
There are other reasons,  apart from equality  with  the deposit-guarantee proposal, for 
considering  the  figure  of ECU  20  000  as  an  appropriate  level  for  the  harmonized 
minimum investor compensation cover in the Community. 
Although there are no useful figures available to  give an  idea of the average amounts 
of money or securities investors will have entrusted at any time to investment firms, as 
defined  in  the  Investment Services Directive,  it is  clear  that  individual  holdings  of 
securities in investment accounts will tend on average to be greater than the amounts 
on deposit  with  credit  institutions.  Therefore if the  future  Directive  is  to  fulfil  its 
intended rule of protecting the small investor the minimum level of cover should be at 
le~t as high as that laid down in the deposit-guarantee Directive.  At the same time a 
.  much higher minimum level would present considerable problems for those Member 
States which currently have no investor compensation scheme or offer a low level of· 
protection. 
-It must,also be borne in mind that the cost ofinvestorprotection is ultimately .reflected 
in the cost of financial services and is thus met by the investor himself. 
B.  Commentary on the Articles 
Article 1 
Article 1 contains a number of definitions necessary for the purposes of the Directive. 
Only  one  definition,  that of "instruments",  corresponds  exactly  to  the  definition  in  the 
Investment Services Directive. 
The definition of "investment firm"  is formulated so  as to cover both  bank and non-bank 
providers of investment services. 
The definition of "investment business" covers both the core investment services listed in 
Section A of the Annex to  the Investment Services Directive and also the one Section C 
(non-core)  service,  namely  safekeeping  and  administration  of securities,  where  there is 
potentially a danger of loss for the smaller investor. 
8 The definition of "investor" is intended to make sure that compulsory investor compensation 
cover should extend only to those clients who have an investment business relationship with 
the investment firm.  This is very important given that the investor compensation Directive 
builds  on  and  should  have  the  same  scope  as  the  Investment  Services Directive.  The 
definition of investor is extremely wide, covering all  persons both natural arid legal.  The 
question of possible exclusions from  the compulsory  coverage is  dealt with  later in  the 
Directive - in Article 3(2) and in the Annex. 
Article 2 
This is the core Article of the proposal. 
It lays down that principle that there must be an investor compensation scheme or schemes 
in each Member State in which all investment firms carrying on investment business must 
take part. 
This  Article  establishes  the  home  country  control  principle  in  respect  of  investor 
compensation arrangements.  The home country scheme must cover the investment business 
carried on by its domestic firms in other Member States, either through branches or via the 
cross-frontier free provision of services. 
The entry into operation of the investor compensation scheme is triggered by  an official 
decision in the firm's home Member State establishing that the firm is imable or likely to 
be unable to meet its commitments to its clients. 
Although the decision may be taken in the context of winding-up proceedings, the payment 
of compensation must be independent of the progress of such proceedings. 
Member States would of course remain free to take preventive action to stop an investment 
firm getting into a situation where it was unable to meet its obligations. 
The investor compensation scheme must provide cover under three headings (indents in 
Article  2(2)).  The  first  relates  to  money  held  by the  investment  firm,  the  second  to 
instruments, essentially shares and bonds, physically held by firms on behalf of investors, 
and the third to instruments that are dematerialized (that is have no physical form) or are 
immobilized  in  (in  other  words  never  leave)  a  central  securities  depository  and  are 
administered by the investment firm.  The third indent would also cover instruments such 
as swaps or forward interest rate agreements or derivatives contracts that have been arranged 
by the investment firm on behalf of clients,  although such clients will tend not to be the 
smaller investors with whom the proposal is principally concerned. 
9 (6) 
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Article 2(3) is intended to deal with the potential problem of  money claims on an investment 
firm  which is  a credit institution.  Given that it will normally be difficult to distinguish 
between ordinary bank deposits and money that is intended for the purchase of securities or 
is  derived  from  their  sale  Member  States  should  be  allowed  to  decide  for  themselves 
whether such claims fall under the investor compensation Directive or the deposit-guarantee 
Directive. 
Article 2(4) determines how the investor's claim is to be evaluated.  As far as money is 
concerned, the value of the claim will always correspond to the amount of money the firm 
actually owes to the client.  As regards securities the valuation should be that at the time 
the  obligation to return  them  arises  or the value  at the time the failure  of the firm  is 
established.  Subsequently of course the market value of securities may rise or fall.  Such 
a risk is inevitable, but the compensation scheme has to be able to  determine exactly its 
liabilities. 
Article 3 
The reasons for selecting ECU 20  000  as the harmonized community minimum level of 
investor compensation were set out in· the General considerations. 
A figure of that order will only be meaningful for the smaller investor.  Provided that the 
· smaller investor is covered, whether he be a natural or a legal person, Member States should 
be free  to determine  whetherLor not they  wish  to  include other  categories of investor. 
Current practice in the Member States differs widely in this respect. 
Accordingly, the Annex to the Directive sets out·a number of categories of larger investor 
which Member States may exclude from compul~.ry coverage if  they so wish.  Only larger 
companies may thus be excluded, small  and medium-sized enterprises falling  within the 
compulsory coverage of the investor compensation scheme. 
Two of the optional exclusions relate to collective investment funds and pension funds. 
This means that under the Directive Member States are given the option of  deciding whether 
or not such funds  should have a  single  claim on the compensation scheme  as  a  single 
investor. 
The management of collective investment funds is not one of the services covered by  the 
Investment Services Directive. 
However,  a  European  passport  for  certain  undertakings  for  collective  investment  in 
transferable  securities  (UCITS)  was  introduced  by  Directive  85/6111EEC<
6>  and  the 
Commission has recently proposed the extension of that Directive to certain other types of 
UCITS (7). 
OJ No L 375, 31.12.1985, p.  3. 
COM(93) 37 final, OJ No C 59, 2.3.1993, p.  14. 
10 The  Commission believes that the question of compensation arrangements for  individual 
investors  in  UCITS  should  be  considered,  if necessary,  in  the  context  of the  special 
arrangements applicable to such funds and in the light of the experience under the  1985 
Directive, and not in the context of  the investor compensation proposal designed to complete 
the single tnarket for the investment services covered by the Investment Services Directive  . 
.  The management of pension funds does,  however, fall  within the scope of service No  3 
(discretionary portfolio management) in Section A of the Annex to the Investment Services 
Directive.  This same service can also be provided by  credit institutions but also  by  life 
insurance undertakings. 
However, the investment service under the Investment Services Directive is provided to the 
pension fund itself or to the trustees or persons otherwise responsible for the fund. 
The Commission again believes that the protection of the individual members of pension 
funds  is a separate and highly  complex issue which  goes well  beyond the scope of the 
.  present proposal for  a Directive arising out of the single market for investment services 
introduced by the Investment Services Directive. 
Article 3(3) makes it clear that Member States are allowed to  provide for compensation 
arrangements going beyond the minimum laid down in the Directive. 
Article 3(4) allows Member States to require investors to bear a small proportion of  any loss 
themselves.  However, until the Directive minimum ofECU 20 000 is reached this enforced 
"coinsurance" may not exceed 100/o of  the loss.  A similar approach has been advocated by 
the Commission it its proposal on deposit-guarantee schemes. 
Article 4 
Given that Article 3(3) allows Member States to  provide compensation  arrangements in 
excess of the Community  minimum it may  happen  that branches of an  investment firm 
(oovered by the home State scheme) operate in a host Member State where the domestic 
scheme. offers a higher level of coverage or covers additional categories of investors.  To 
avoid confusion on the part of investors and to allow such branches to  compete on equal 
terms this Article states that Member States must take steps to allow such branches to join, 
if they wish, the host scheme on a supplementary basis in order to  bring their home State 
cover up to level available locally from domestic firms in the host Member State. 
This  possibility  has  also  been  advocated  by  the  Commission  in  its  deposit-guarantee 
proposal. 
11 ArticleS 
This Article deals with the situation where an  investment firm fails to respect the rules and 
obligations of its home State scheme or where a branch using the Article 4 option· fails to 
respect the host scheme rules.  · 
The competent authorities must be give appropriate discretion in dealing with this difficult, 
but unlikely, eventuality.  In particular only the competent authorities which issued the firm's 
authorization can decide on its revocation.  · · 
If an investment firm or branch is excluded from a scheme investors must be ensured of 
cover  while  they  decide  whether  or  not  to  make  alternative  arrangements  for  their 
investments. 
Article 6 
Compensation is to be calculated and paid per investor rather than on a per account basis. 
Thus all  the investments  of a  single investor with  the  head office  and branches of an 
investment firm in the Community will be aggregated. 
Given the increasingly international nature of investment business, money and instruments 
in any currency should be covered.  ' ·  · 
Article7 
It does not appear feasible to lay down a·rigid timetable for the payment of compensation 
to investors in the event of the failure of an investment firm..  .  . 
Where there is fraud or serious mismanagement the compensation scheme may well find that 
the firm's records are missing or unreliable.  In such cases, it may take a considerable period 
of time to contact investors and establish their precise claims. 
Accordingly, this Article simply states that an investor's claim should be settled rapidly -
within a period of three months from  the firm's  failure  provided that the  eligibility  and 
amount of the claim have been properly established. 
The scheme should be allowed to reqUire. investors to present their claims within a period 
of six months of  the firm's fai.lure but this deadline should not be absolute when the investor 
has good reason for presenting a late claim. 
Article 8 
This Article lays down the obligation on investment firms to inform investors in their own 
language of the applicable compensation arrangements. 
12 Article 9 
This Article  lays down  a  corresponding obligation on branches of firms  with  their head 
office outside the Community. 
The provisions governing the establishment and operation of such branches are determined 
by  each Member State.  Such branches do not of course benefit from the single licence. 
Article 10 
This Article deals with the compensation scheme's subrogation rights. 
Article 11 
The investor compensation schemes Directive should enter into force on 1 January 1996, the 
same date as has been fixed for the implementation of the Investment Services Directive. 
This simultaneous entry  into  force is envisaged in  Article  12 of the Investment Services 
Directive. 
Article 12 
This is a review Article.  It would appear appropriate to  carry  out a review once some 
experience has been acquired of the operation of the single market for investment services 
and  in  particular of the  operation of the  harmonized  minimum  investor  compensation 
arrangements provided for in this Directive. 
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Max •  .LoF  250.000  per 
client  (•ECU  6.200). 
Limit  o~ 201  o! the 
a.3~Ett~  of the guarantee 
fund  a!5  at 31.12 of year 
preceeding the failure. 
ANNEX 
Operation/  :ln.  tervention 
Failura  ha.s  to  be  established 
and  publi.5hed  by  tho  Soci~tll 
de.s  Bourse!!  Franr;:aise!5. 
Client~ have  3  months  to 
pxe:!lent  their claim". 
At  di!lcretion of  Fund 
Committee.  Law  ensure" 
investor.s'  !Securities 
holding.5  cannot  be  touched  in 
event  of  in!lol  vency. COtmtry 
~· 
BII:LGml4 
SPADI 
~ 
'UMrlii:D  ICilfGDOIC 
IRl!:LAND 
~iUe, COD•t.ituUoa  ·-t 
Mo  fund  compensate::~~ 
inve•tcrs directly.  Two 
JSehelUes  exist  : 
l. COlllPiln!lation  ~cheme 
(<XMllg!onds)  or de 
vereniqing voor  de 
S!!eet.enhandel 
iVIIdE). 
Run  by  a  Foundation. 
2.  Guarantee Fund  of 
Central Bank  (DN!l) 
Th&  law o! 1.12.90 
created the  Cai!!e 
d'  intervention de! 
soci6t6JS de bour:se.  The 
royal  Decree ot ·2.1.91 
established a  'fonds 
d'  intervention' within 
the Cai•oe.  Run  by  a 
conoeil 
d • administration. 
New  rule.5  concerning 
inve.!!ltor  compen.sation 
are said to be  under 
review. 
There  is no compensation 
schema  in Denmark. 
Investors camperuation 
:tcheme  established by 
SIB  in  1999 under 
•oction 51  o! the  P'SA. 
Run  by  a  "eparate 
management  company. 
Investor"  CompeMation 
Schell\e  Limited. 
Stock  Bxchanqe 
Compensation  Fund. 
-r.h:l.p 
Company  members  of the 
VVdE. 
COtllpulsory  tor all 
credit institution•. 
campul•ory !or all 
:~oci6t's de  bour:!le  dG 
droit belge. 
compulsory  tor members 
o! the participating 
SRC•  and  firms directly 
regulated  by  SIB. 
H&mber•  of the 
exchange. 
I'  :!.Dancing/ 
oon.tri.but.i.ona 
Lovy  on all  member:~ 
ba.sed  on  revenue 
213  !rom bank•  and 
broker-' 
1/  3  from  the "hoekmantt 
Collective guarantee 
~y,tem.  Total  amount 
payable  apportioned in 
proportion to scale ot  .. 
bu:siness. 
one-ott contribution 
base  on capital or 
number  or agents  de 
chanqe.  Annual 
contribution based  on 
turnover. 
By  retrospective levy 
on  scheme 
participants. 
canpensation cost5 
levied in tir•t 
instance on  members  of 
SRO  (or  SIB)  Where 
default occurred with 
provi.~ion tor cross-
contributian as 
appropriate. 
contribution> caUed 
wben  necessary. 
Fund  partially 
ln:!lured. 
!'yp. of!  oUell~ 
OO'Y'WH4 
Comper13ation  not paid 
direct to inve3tors 
covars deficits of 
member  in event ot 
default. 
Private  per~oms, 
aseociation:s  or 
foundatioms  not  l~al 
entities. 
Private clients and 
91All busine,ses. 
Basically private 
clients only,  although 
non-profe.s!!lional 
inve:stor corporate 
client.s might  recover 
(the •ystem is 
discretionary.) . 
1  ~ 
~ 
N/A 
Ca:!lh  accounts or 
depo.sited  securities. 
Lo:s:se:s  must  relate to 
UK  inve:stment busine:s.s. 
Ca3h, aod .securities. 
Leve1 ~  oover 
N/A 
Max.  FL  4 0000  per 
creditor  (='ECU  18.200). 
FB  2.5 lllillion per 
creditor  (aBCtJ  62.200). 
fB  0. 5  1\illion for  ca.:sh 
deposits  c~scu 12.400). 
Max.  o!  FB  200  million 
per  failu.t&  and  FB  250 
million per year. 
Fir:st  £  30000  lOOl  cover 
next  t  20000  901  cover 
i.e. max.  £  48000  per 
claim  (=BCU  61. 100) 
Annual  maJ<.  o! £  100 
million. 
Max.  £  48000  per client. 
same  ba.si.s  a.s  UK. 
OVerall  limit of 
£  4.5 million. 
(Amount!!  in  £  .sterling). 
opera  t.i.on/  i.ntervt&D  Uon 
At discretion of the 
Foundation Board;  one.xchange 
business  only. 
A  societe de bourse  mu.st  have 
failed  :  faillite or 
concordat  judiciaire. 
Preventive  intervention al!!O 
po••ible. 
Board  mu.st  declare  a  firm in 
default before clai...rn!!  can be 
c~idered.  ICS  need!!  to 
have  evidence of the  firm'  .s 
inability to pay  claims. 
This  normally,  but  not 
nece:s5arily,  rue aM  thAt 
liquidation or bankruptcy 
proceeding~ will have  begun. 
Fund  i:!ll  di3cretionary. 
Operated  by  the  Council  of 
the  ISE,  under  ISE 
Regulation,:. Country 
GIU!ZICS 
= 
~:1Ue, Constitution 
&~t 
ccmperusation fund  for 
Brokers •  transactions 
•at up by  Law 3078/54. 
A  special  f'und  covers 
incorporated 
:stockbroking  fi.I""e 
engaging in off-exchange 
business and 
underwritinq. 
rondo Hazionale di 
~ranzia set up  by 
Art.  15  of the  SIMS  Law 
of 2.1,1991.  Detailed 
rules  lAid down  in 
Decree -of the Treasury 
Kinbter o! 30.9.1991. 
~ship 
Compulsory  for  a.ll 
stockbrokers  and 
stockbrokinq companie:s • 
Compulsory  for all 
intermediaries covered 
by  SIMS  law.. 
IW>anaiDg'/ 
ac:mtribaUon• 
Contribution paid by 
all new members. 
Bxtra 151  or  share 
capital exCeedinq 
DR  700.000. 
Fixed contribution of 
(initally) 
Lit  1  million p1u. 
variable contribution 
based on volume  of 
business. 
'rype  o~ cu.  ...  t 
""""n<S 
----
Client individuals  and 
institutions. 
All clients,  except 
intermediaries 
authorized to deal  !or 
their own  account or on 
behalf of third 
partie•. 
1 6 
Covwraqe 
Transactions effected 
during  a  stock exchange 
session. 
Cash claims  and claW 
for the return of 
securitie:s,  provided 
they are  recoqnized by 
the bodies  responsible 
for  the >ri.nding-up 
proeedure. 
Leve1  ~  oover 
creditor:J of a  !ailed 
broker receive his share 
of the Fund,  plus  a 
further  201  o! remaining 
fund if necessary.  If a 
number  or brokers !ail 
simultaneously up to BOt 
of fund  can be 
di~tributed. 
Limit  of 251  of each 
client'  :J  claim..  Fund may 
not  pay  out  more  than  401 
of it:s  a.ssets  for  ac.y  one 
failure. 
operation/1nterventl.on 
Administrative Board of Fund 
appear., to have discretion re 
fund intervention. 
Failuxe/insolvency of an 
int.ermediary. Proposal for a 
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
on investor compensation schemes 
1HE COUNCIL OF 1HE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIFS, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular 
Article 57(2) thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission(!>, 
In cooperation with the European Parliament<
2>, 
Having regard to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee<
3>, 
Whereas on 10 May  1993  the Council adopted Directive 93/22/EEC on investnient services in 
the securities field<
4>, hereinafter referred to as "the Investment Services Directive"~  whereas that 
Directive is an essential measure for the achievement of  the internal market for investment firms; 
Whereas the Investment Services Directive. secures the essential harmonization that is necessary 
to secure the mutual recognition of authorization and of  prudential supervision systems, making 
possible the grant of a single authorization valid throughout the Community and the application 
of the principle of home Member State supervision;  whereas,· by virtue of mutual recognition, 
investment. firms authorized in their home Member States may carry on any or all of  the services 
covered  by  the  Investment  Services  Directive  for  which  they  have  received  authorization 
throughout the Community by establishing branches or under the freedom to provide services; 
Whereas the protection of investors and the maintenance of confidence in the financial system 
is an important aspect of the completion of the internal market in this area; 
Whereas the Investment Services Directive provides for prudential rules which investment firms 
must observe at all times, including rules the purpose of which is to protect as  far  as possible 
investors' rights in respect of money or instruments belonging to them~ 
Whereas, however, no system of  supervision can provide a complete safeguard, particularly where 
acts of fraud are committed; 
(I) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4)  OJ No L 141, 11.6.1993, p.  27. 
17 Whereas it is therefore important that each Member State should have an investor compensation 
scheme providing a minimum level of  compen~ation at least to the smaller investor in the event 
that an investment firm is unable to  meet its obligations to its investor clients;  whereas such is 
not the case at present; 
Whereas the Commission's initial proposal for an investment services directiveCs) included in the 
list in Article 9 of prudential rules to  be observed by investment firms and to be supervised by 
the home Member State's authorities membership of a general compensation scheme to protect 
investors;  whereas, however, the Commission proposed that, pending further harmonization of 
compensation schemes, branches should be subject to the compensation scheme in force in the 
host Member State; 
Whereas, however, this interim solution was rejected by the Member States in favour of a full 
home oountry  approach,  given  the  responsibility  of the  home Member  State for issuing the 
authorization to investment firms and for their prudential supervision;  whereas it was argued that 
application of the home country  control principle required that the home State compensation 
scheme should cover the activities carried on in host Member States, through branches or via 
freedom to provide services; 
Whereas  it  was  the general  view that the  complex issues  raised  by  the  subject of investor 
Compensation schemes could be adequately dealt with only in a separate proposal for a directive; 
whereas Article 12 of  the Investment Services Directive does not require Member States to have 
an  investor  compensation  scheme  but  merely  requires  that  investors  be  informed  of the 
compensation arrangements available, if  any; whereas the Commission stated that it would submit 
proposals on the haimonization of compensation systems covering transactions by investment 
firms by 31  July 1993 at the latest; 
Whereas the proper functioning of the internal market requires a degree of coordination in this 
area so that the small investor can purchase investment services from branches of Community 
investment firms or on a cross-frontier basis as confidently as from domestic investment firms, 
in the knowledge that a Community minimum level of compensation would be available in the 
event of the failure of the investment firm and its subsequent inability to return the investor's 
money or securities; 
Whereas  in  the  absence of such  coordination  host Member  States  may  consider themselves 
justified  for  reasons  of  investor  protection  in  requiring  membership  of  the  host  State 
compensation amingement when a Community investment firm operating via a  branch or via 
freedom  to  provide services  either belongs to  no  investor compensation scheme in its home 
Member State or belongs to a scheme which is not considered to offer equivalent protection; 
whereas any such requirement might create serious difficulties for  the operation of the single 
market; 
(5)  OJ No C 43, 22.2.1989, p.  7. 
18 Whereas  Council  Directive .  ../. .. IEEC [on  deposit-guarantee  schemes  ]<6)  introduced  mtmmum 
harmonization of  deposit-guarantee arrangements for credit institutions; whereas credit institutions 
may  in  certain areas be in  competition with specialist investment firms; 
.  i .. 
Whereas although most Member States currently have some investor compensation arrangement~ 
the vast majority do not have arrangements corresponding to the scope of  the Investment Ser\.rices 
Directive; 
Whereas therefore all  the Member  Stat~s sho,uld be required to have an  investor comp.en.sation 
scheme;. or. schemes,  to  which  all  investment  'fi.rms 'holding  the  single  licence  unde'i-.  tll;; 
Investment  Services  Directive  should  belong;  whereas  the scheme should  cover  money  or 
instruments which are held by the investment firm in connection with the conduct of investment 
business and which, following the failure of the firm, cannot be returned to the investor; 
Whereas the definition of investment finn  includes credit institutions which are  authorized to 
provide investment services; whereas such credit institutions should also be required to participate 
in an investor compensation scheme in respect of their investment business;  whereas, however·, 
in the case of investment firms which are credit institutions it may in certain cases be difficult 
to distinguish between deposits covered under Directive .  .1 ... /EEC [on deposit-guarantee schemes] 
and money held in connection with the conduct of  investment business;  whereas Member States 
should be given the possibility of themselves determining under which Directive such clairris 
should fall;  '  ·--· 
Whereas Directive .. .1 ... /EEC [on deposit-guarantee schemes] alloWs Member States to dispense 
a credit institution from the obligation to belong to a deposit~guarantee scheme where that credit 
institution belongs  to  a  system  which  protects the  credit  institution  itself and,  in  particular, 
ensures its solvency; whereas, where such a credit institution is also an investment firm, Member 
States  should also  be  authorized  to  dispense  it  from  the obligation to  belong to  an  investor 
compensation scheme; 
Whereas the cost of investor protection has  to  be  met  by  investment firms  but is  ultimately 
passed  on to  the  investor;  whereas  therefore  it  is  undesirable  to  introduce  throughout  the 
Community a very high level of  protection;  whereas in addition to encourage the investor to take 
due care in the choice of an investment firm it is reasonable to allow Member States to require 
the investor to bear a proportion of any loss;  whereas, however,  the investor should be covered 
for at least 90% of his loss until the compensation payment reaches the Community min.imum; 
Whereas  a  harmonized  minimum  level  of compensation  should  be  sufficient  to  protect  the 
interests of the smaller investor in the event of the failure of an investment firm; 
Whereas a similar level was proposed by the Commission in its amended proposal for a Council 
Directive on deposit-guarantee schemes; 
(6)  OJ No L 
19 Whereas the schemes of certain Member States currently offer higher levels of cover;  whereas,  .-
however, it does not seem appropriate to require that those schemes should reduce the cover they 
offer;  · 
Whereas the retention in the Community of schemes providing coverage which is higher than the 
harmonized minimum may lead on the same territory to  disparities in compensation which are 
prejudicial to investors and unequal conditions of competition between national investment firms 
( 
and  the  branches  of firms  of other Meml>er  States;  whereas,  in  order to  counteract  these 
disadvantages, branches should be allowed to join the host country scheme on a supplementary 
basis so that they can offer the same level of cover as is offered by the scheme of the country 
where they are located; 
Whereas the objective of this Directive is to  ensure a minimum level of protection for small 
investors,  including  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises,  who  have  the  greatest  need  of 
protection;  whereas,  however,  Member States  should  be allowed  to  exclude  from  coverage 
certain other categories of investors who have a lesser need of such protection; 
Whereas  a  number  of  Member  States  have  investor -compensation  schemes  under  the 
responsibility  of professional  organizations;  whereas  other  schemes  may  be  set  up  and 
administered on a statutory basis;  whereas this variety of  status poses a problem only with regard 
to compulsocy membership of  and exclusion from the scheme;  Whereas it is therefore necessacy 
. to take steps to limit the powers of schemes in this area; 
Whereas  the  investor  should  receive  compensation  without  excessive  delay  once  he  has 
established a valid claim; whereas the compensation scheme itself should be allowed to fix a 
reasonable period during which claims should be presented;  whereas, however, the fact that such 
a period has expired should not be invoked against an  investor who for a good reason has not 
been able to present his claim on time; 
Whereas investor information on compensation arrangements is an essential element in investor 
protection and must therefore also be the subject of a minimum number of binding provisions; 
Whereas subject to  Article 5 of the Investment Services Directive and Article 9(1) of Council 
Directive  77/780/EEC  of 12  December  1977  on  the  coordination  of laws,  regulations  and 
administrative  provisions  relating  to  the  taking  up  and  pursuit  of the  business  of credit 
institutions(7>,  as  last amended by Directive  89/646/EEC<
8>,  Member States  are free  to  decide 
whether and on what conditions to  admit the branches of investment firms having their head 
office in third countries to operate on their territory; whereas such branches will not benefit from 
(1) 
{8) 
OJ No L 322, 17.12.1977, p.  30. 
OJ No L 386, 30.12.1989, p.  1. 
20 freedom to provide services by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 59 of the Treaty, nor 
from  freedom  of establishment  in  Member  States  other . than  the  one  in  which  they  are 
established~  whereas accordingly a Member State admitting such branches may decide to oblige 
or permit such branches to participate in the investor compensation scheme  in  place on their 
territory;  whereas, however,  it is appropriate that such  branches should be required to  inform 
their investment clients of whether or not they  belong to  any  compensation scheme and of the 
extent and limits of any such coverage; 
Whereas in conclusion a minimum harmonization of  investor compensation arrangements appears 
necessary  in order to  complete the internal  market .for investment  firms  by  giving  investors 
confidence to deal With firms from other Member States as well as locally incorporated fif'Qls and 
by avoiding the difficulties that might arise from the application by host Member States of their 
uncoordinated domestic investor protection requirements; whereas a binding Community directive 
is the only suitable instrument to achieve the desired objective in the general absence of  investor 
compensation arrangements corresponding to the coverage of the Investment Services Directive; 
whereas  this  measure  restricts  itself to  the  minimum  harmonization  that  is  required, ·.allows . 
Member States freedom  to  provide wider or higher  coverage  if they  desire  and  also  allows 
Member  States  considerable  freedom  as  regards  the  organization  and  financing  of investor 
compensation schemes, 
HAS ADOPTED TillS DIRECTIVE: 
Article 1 
For the purposes of this Directive the following definitions shall apply: 
I.  "Investment firm"  shall mean an  investment firm  authorized in  accordance with Article-3 
of  the Investment Services Directive, or a credit institution the authorization of which, under · 
Directives  771780/EEC  and  89/646/EEC,  covers one or more  of the  investment services 
listed in Section A of the Annex to the Investment Services Directive; 
2.  "investment business"  shall  mean  an  investment service as  defined in Article  1(1) of the 
Investment Services Directive and the service referred to in  point 1 of Section C of the 
Annex to the Investment Services Directive; 
3.  "instruments" shall mean the instruments listed in Section B of  the Annex to the Investment 
Services Directive; 
4.  "investor" shall mean a person who has entrusted money or instruments to  an  investment 
firm in connection with investment business. 
21 Article 2 
I.  Each  Member State  shall  ~nsure that  an  investor  compensation  scheme  (or schemes)  is 
established and officially recognized on its territory. No investment firm which it authorizes 
may carry on investment business unless it participates in such a scheme. The scheme shall 
provide cover to investors in respect of investment business carried on  under freedom to 
provide services in  other Member States and in  respect of investment business carried on 
through branches set up by investment firms in other Member States. 
However, Member States may exempt a credit institution which is also an investment firm 
from belonging to an investor compensation scheme where that credit institution belongs to 
a system which protects the credit institution itself and in particular ensures its solvency, 
thus  guaranteeing  a  protection  for  investors  at  least  equivalent  to  that  provided  by  an 
investor compensation scheme and which in the opinimi of  the competent authorities fulfils . 
the  conditions  laid  down  in  Article 2(1)  of Directive  .. .1 ... /EEC  [on  deposit-guarantee 
schemes). 
2.  The scheme shall provide cover to investors in accordance with Article 3 where a decision 
of  the scheme or of the competent authorities or of a judicial authority in the home Member 
State has determined that an investment firm is unable or is likely to be unable to  meet its 
obligations resulting from investors' claims relating to : 
the repayment of money belonging to investors and lield on their behalf in connection 
with investment business, or 
the return to investors of any instruments belonging to them and physically held on their 
behalf in connection with investment business, or 
the  return  to  investors  of any  instruments  belonging  to  them  and  administered  or 
arranged on their behalf in connection with investment business. 
3.  Any  claim  under the  first  indent of paragraph 2 on  an  investment  finn  that  is  a credit 
institution  which,  in  a  Member  State,  would  be  subject  both  to  this  Directive  and  to 
Directive .. .1 ... /EEC [on deposit-guarantee schemes] shall be allocated to a scheme under one 
or other of these Directives as that State shall consider appropriate. No claim in respect of 
a single amount shall be eligible for compensation under both Directives. 
4.  The amount of an investor's claim shall be calculated on the basis of the amount of money 
or the market value of the instruments belonging to the investor which the investment firm 
is unable to  repay  or return at the time the  obligation to  make  repayment or return  the 
instruments arises or at the time of the decision referred to in paragraph 2. 
22 Article 3 
1.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the · scheme  provides  for  coverage  of not  less  than 
ECU 20 000 per investor in respect of the claims referred to  in Article 2(2). 
2.  Notwithstanding paragraph 1 Member States may provide that certain categories of  investors 
shall  be excluded from  the  coverage of-the scheme or shall be granted a lower level of 
coverage. The categories in  question are listed in the Annex. 
3.  Paragraphs 1 ·and 2 shall not preclude the retention or adoption of provisions which offer 
more  comprehensive  cover  for  investors,  in  particular  by  extending  the  categories  of 
investors  protected by the guarantee or by  providing a higher level of compensation. 
4.  Member  States  may  limit the  cover provided for  in  paragraph  1 or that  referred  to  in 
paragraph  3  to a· specified  percentage of the investor's  claim.  However,  the  percentage  · 
covered must  equal  or exceed 90% of the claim  until  the  amount  to  be. paid  under the 
scheme reaches ECU 20 000. 
/ 
Article 4 
A branch of  an investment firm authorized in another Member State may apply to join voluntarily 
a scheme covering the category of investment finn to which it belongs in the Member State in 
which it is established in order to supplement the coverage which its investors already enjoy by 
virtue of their obligatory coverage by the scheme referred to  in Article 2. 
Member States shall ensure that objective conditions relating to the membership of  these branches 
form part of all investor compensation schemes. 
ArticleS 
If an investment firm required by Article 2(1) to  take part in a scheme or one of the branches 
granted vohmtary membership under Article 4 does not comply with the obligations incumbent 
on it as a member of  .the scheme, the competent authorities which:issued the authorization shall  ~· 
be notified  and,  in  cooperation  with  the  managers  of the scheme,  shall  take  all  appropriate 
measures, including the imposition of  penalties, to secure compliance by the investment firm with 
its obligations. 
If, as a result of  these measures, compliance by the investment finn, or branch thereof, with their 
obligations is  not secured,  the  managers of the scheme may  exclude the  investment firm  or 
branch,  where  national  law authorizes  such  exclusion  and  with  the  explicit  consent of the 
competent authorities.  · 
In that case,  the coverage of money  or instruments belonging  to  investors  and  held by  the 
investment firm or branch thereof at the date of  exclusion shall be maintained for twelve months 
from the date of exclusion. 
23 Article 6 
1.  The coverage referred in in Article 3(1), (3) and (4) shall apply to the aggregate amount of 
money  and  instruments  belonging  to  the  investor  and  held  by  the  investment  firm 
irrespective of  the number of accounts, the currency and the location within the Community. 
2.  The share of each investor in a joint investment acc01mt  shall  be taken  into  account in 
calculating the coverage provided for in Article 3(1), (3) and (4). 
In the  absence of special  provisions the  account shall  be divided  equally  between the 
investors. 
Article 7 
I.  Member States shall ensure that the scheme is able to meet an  investor's claim within a 
maximum period of three months from the date of the decision referred to in  Article 2(2) 
if the eligibility and amount of that claim have been established. 
2.  The compensation scheme shall  be  allowed to fix  a period of not less than six months 
following the decision referred to in Article 2(2) during which investors may be required to 
submit their claims. 
However, the expiry of such a period may not be invoked by the scheme in order to deny 
the benefit of coverage to an investor who, due to absence or for any other good reason, has 
been unable to assert his claim under the compensation scheme in time. 
Article 8 
1.  Member States shall ensure that the managers of the investment firm  provide actual  and 
potential  investors  with  the  information  necessary  for  them  to  identify  the  investor 
compensation scheme in which the investment firm and its branches take part within the 
Community. The level of coverage under the scheme shall be made known t6 investors. 
Information shall also be given on request on the conditions governing compensation and 
the formalities which must be fulfilled in order to obtain compensation. 
Member States shall ensure that investors are informed where an investment firm is excluded 
from an investor compensation scheme in accordance with Article 5. 
2.  The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be made available in the officiallanguage(s) 
of  the Member State in which a branch is established or in which services are provided and 
shall be drafted in a clear and comprehensible form. 
24 Article. 9 
1.  Actual  and  intending  investors  at  branches  established  by  investment  firms  with  their 
registered office outside the Community shall be provided by  the investment firm with all 
relevant  information  concerning  the  compensation  arrangements  which  cover  their 
investments. 
2.  The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be made available in the officiallanguage(s) 
of  the Member State in which the branch is established in the manner prescribed by national 
law and shall be drafted in a clear and comprehensible form. 
Article 10 
· Without  prejudice  to ·any  other  rights  which  it  may  have  under  national  law,  an  investor 
compensation  scheme  which  pays  investors'  claims  shall  be subrogated  to  the  rights of the 
investors in the liquidation proceedings for an amount equivalent to its payment. 
Article 11 
No later than five years after the date mentioned in Article 12(1), the Commission shall present 
a report to the Council on the application of this Directive, accompanied where appropriate by 
proposals for its revision. 
Article 12 
1.  ·Member States shall  bring into force the laws,  regulations and administrative provisions 
necessary to comply with this Directive by 31  December 1995. They shall forthwith inform 
the Commission thereof. 
When Member States adopt these provisions, these shall contain a reference to this Directive 
or shall  be accompanied by such reference at the time of their official publication.  The 
procedure for .such reference shall be adopted by Member States. 
2.  Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of  the main laws, regulations 
and administrative decisions which they adopt in the field covered by  this Directive. 
Article 13 
This Directive  i~ addressed to the Member States. 
Don~  at Brussels, 
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For the Council 
The President ANNEX 
LIST OF THE CATEGORIES OF INVESTORS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 3 
1.  Investment firms as defined in Article 1(2) of the Investment Services Directive. 
2.  Credit institutions as defined in the first indent of Article 1 of Directive 77/780/EEC. 
3.  Financial institutions aS defined in Article 1(6) of Directive 89/646/EEC. 
4.  Insurance undertakings as defmed in Article  I  of Directive 73/239/EEC  or Article  I  of 
Directive 79/267/EEC or undertakings carrying on the reinsurance and retrocession activities 
referred to in Directive 64/225/EEC. 
5.  Undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities. 
6.  Pension or retirement funds. 
7.  Other institutional investors  . 
.. 8.  Government and central administrative authorities. 
9.  Provincial, regional, local or municipal authorities. 
I 0.  Directors and  managers of and  members personally liable in the investment firm, holders 
of at least 5 % of  the capital of  the investment firm, members of  the external auditing bodies 
who audit the accounts of  the investment firm and investors with similar status in the other 
companies in the same group. 
11.  Close relatives and third parties acting on behalf of the investors referred to at point I 0. 
12.  Other companies in the same group. 
13.  Investors who have on an  individual basis  obtained from  the investment firm  rates and 
financial  concessions  which  have  helped  to  aggravate  the  financial  situation  of that 
investment firm. 
14.  Companies which are of such a size that they exceed the criteria for drawing up abridged 
balance  sheets  laid  down  in  Article  11  of Directive  78/660/EEC,  as  last  amended  by 
Directive .. .1 ... /EEC. 
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